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ABSTRACT
We examine the effects of collateralized borrowing in a realistically parameterized life-cycle
portfolio choice problem. We provide basic intuition in a two-period model and then solve a
multi-period model computationally. Our analysis provides insights into life-cycle portfolio choice
relevant for researchers in macroeconomics and finance. In particular, we show that standard models
with unlimited borrowing at the riskless rate dramatically overstate the gains to holding equity when
compared with collateral-constrained models. Our results do not depend on the specification of the
collateralized borrowing regime: the gains to trading equity remain relatively small even with the
unrealistic assumption of unlimited leverage. We argue that our results strengthen the role of
borrowing constraints in explaining the portfolio participation puzzle, that is, why most investors
do not own stock.
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In this paper, we examine the eﬀects of collateralized borrowing in a realistically
parameterized life-cycle portfolio choice problem. In doing so, we ﬁll an important
gap in the literature. Previous applied researchers have, for reasons of analytical
or computational convenience rather than realism, selected from a set of extreme
assumptions about collateralized borrowing. Some assumed that investors can borrow
unlimited amounts at the riskless rate. Others assumed that investors cannot use
any assets as collateral for loans. And yet others assumed nonnegativity of investor
net asset positions, implying that investors can use any long position in one asset
as collateral for a short position in another. In this paper, we consider a realistic
intermediate case: Investors can use some portion (possibly all) of their long positions
to borrow at an interest rate that exceeds (at least weakly) the interest rate on a
riskless asset.
Investors in our model face a very complex problem. They can engage in secured
borrowing at one interest rate, unsecured borrowing at another, and riskless lending
at yet a third. They face limits on the ratio of unsecured borrowing to labor income
and limits on the ratio of secured borrowing to holdings of the risky asset. Despite
these added complexities, we show that one can use a simple back-of-the-envelope
approach and get the basic intuition for the solution. Using our back-of-the-envelope
approach, we show some simple, somewhat counterintuitive results about the rela-
tionship between wealth, income, secured borrowing, and the demand for equity. We
then calculate policy rules and explore the distribution of portfolio choices using a
computational model.
Our analysis provides insights into life-cycle portfolio choice relevant for researchers
in macroeconomics and ﬁnance. In particular, we show that standard models with
unlimited borrowing at the riskless rate dramatically overstate the gains to holding
equity when compared with models with even an unrealistically generous collateral-
ized borrowing regime. Further, we show that with a realistic collateralized borrowing
regime, the gains to holding equity over the life cycle exceed by only a narrow margin
the gains to holding equity in a model with no uncollateralized borrowing at all.
Our results signiﬁcantly strengthen the role of borrowing constraints in explain-
ing why most investors do not hold stock, a phenomenon often referred to as “the
participation puzzle.” In a series of recent papers, researchers have shown that when
investors face borrowing constraints, investors gain so little from trade in equity that
relatively small transactions, or participation or information costs, can explain why
they forsake equity altogether. But to generate these results, all the researchers as-
sume that investors cannot use long positions in equity as collateral for loans, one of
1the extreme assumptions about collateralized borrowing discussed above. Critics have
argued that relaxation of that assumption would overturn borrowing constraints as
an explanation of the participation puzzle. Our results do not support this criticism.
With realistic levels of collateralized borrowing, the gains to holding equity remain
small.
In modeling the life-cycle consumption problem, we choose to ignore the role of
housing, an omission that requires an explanation, as housing accounts for a large
fraction of the collateralized borrowing conducted by households. The goal of this
paper is not to provide a comprehensive theoretical description of the household
portfolio decision, but to ask how the ability to leverage equity holdings through
collateral aﬀects the demand for equity and the gains to trading it. Not only does
housing not directly aﬀect that question, but if we added housing to our model, we
would then have to disentangle the eﬀects of housing and the eﬀects of collateralized
borrowing on equity demand. Put another way, in this paper we address a criticism
of research that, with a few exceptions, ignores housing as well. In no way should the
above suggest that we think housing is unimportant to household portfolio choice or
to the demand for equity. On the contrary, the small gains to trade in equity revealed
in this paper illustrate the misguidedness of the traditional focus on stocks and bonds
in household portfolio choice problems. In other work [Kubler and Willen (2006)],
we directly address the question of housing collateral in a multi-asset version of the
model developed here.
Our work also adds to recent work on the “limits of arbitrage.” Typically, such
work focuses on limits to theoretically proﬁtable strategies faced by highly sophisti-
cated, wealthy investors.1 We show below that these portfolio limitations present an
even more serious problem for the small investor when he or she tries to “arbitrage”
the risk-adjusted returns on diﬀerent assets.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the remainder of the introduction, we con-
duct a literature review, exploring in detail the diﬀerent approaches to collateralized
borrowing mentioned above. In Section 2, we present the model and our simple back-
of-the-envelope approach for analyzing consumption-portfolio problems with risky
assets and collateralized and uncollateralized borrowing in a two-period model.
In the rest of the paper, we focus on measuring the quantitative importance of
collateralized borrowing in our model. To do this, we ﬁrst need to get some idea of
opportunities for using equity as collateral for loans in the real world, starting with
margin loans and moving to more indirect methods like futures and mutual funds that
1For examples, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2006),
and Geanakoplos (2003).
2invest in options to get leverage. In Section 3, we conclude that investors can easily
use at least half their investment as collateral (and thus get at least 2:1 leverage),
but the interest rate on such borrowing (either explicitly or implicitly) exceeds the
interest rate on riskless investment by a particularly wide margin for small investors.
In Section 4, we develop our multi-period life-cycle model, calculate policy rules,
and run simulations. We show that with what we consider realistic borrowing regimes,
the gains to trading equity are small. One example we consider involves an investor
with a relative risk aversion coeﬃcient of 3 and an equity premium of 4 percent.
Suppose an investor can use 75 percent of his or her equity holdings as collateral for
a loan at an interest rate 100 basis points above the riskless rate, a very generous
borrowing regime, as our evidence in Section 3 shows. Further, our investor can
borrow as much as one year’s labor income without security at an interest rate 800
basis points above the riskless rate. Under these conditions, the ability to trade
equity raises lifetime certain-equivalent consumption by less than 2 percent. To put
this in perspective, a model with unlimited borrowing and lending at the riskless
rate yields gains to trading equity of 25 percent of lifetime consumption (under the
maintained assumptions). What accounts for the gap? We show that realistic limits
to collateralized borrowing account for only a small part. If investors could use all
their equity holdings as collateral for loans and borrow at the riskless rate, lifetime
certain-equivalent consumption would rise by 6.7 percent, narrowing the gap by only
about a ﬁfth. Our assumptions about unsecured borrowing account for the rest of
the gap. The key insight is that to fully exploit collateralized borrowing, one must
also be able to take out unsecured loans, both to consume future excess returns on
equity and to smooth adverse stock return outcomes.
In Section 5, we brieﬂy explore the extent of collateralized borrowing against eq-
uity. Consistent with our results, we ﬁnd that investors engage in practically none.
According to the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), fewer than 1 percent of in-
vestors took out margin loans in 1998. Among households that held stock, around 4
percent took out margin loans, and the average value of those loans was only $844.
In Section 6, we address the participation puzzle, and a brief conclusion follows in
Section 7.
1.1 Literature Review
In the classical theoretical literature on life-cycle portfolio choice, researchers assume
that investors can borrow unlimited amounts at the riskless rate. Both Merton (1969)
and Samuelson (1969) make such assumptions in their path-breaking works. The most
important paper on portfolio choice in the intervening 40 years, Cox and Huang’s
3(1989) martingale approach, continues in that tradition. The vast majority of applied
researchers on portfolio choice still work in this framework [see Brandt (2005) for a
survey].
Starting in the late 1980s, researchers developed theoretical models with more
realistic borrowing regimes. Researchers adopted many diﬀerent approaches, but
three basic types emerged.
The ﬁrst approach restricts investors’ holdings of each asset separately. For ex-
ample, we might prohibit short sales of stocks and bonds and allow borrowing, but
at a high interest rate. The key here is that restrictions on holdings of one asset are
independent of restrictions on holdings of any other asset. So, even if you held a
large position in bonds, you would still not be able to sell stocks short. Examples of
this approach include work by Heaton and Lucas (1997, 2000), Cocco, Gomes, and
Maenhout (2005), Gomes and Michaelides (2005), Davis, Kubler, and Willen (2006),
and others.
The second approach is to require that investors maintain positive wealth. In other
words, one can hold a short position in one asset so long as one has an oﬀsetting long
position in something else. So, one can use 100 percent of a long position in an asset as
collateral for a loan. Late-night television audiences would recognize such “No Money
Down” investment opportunities. Wall Streeters would say that investors in such
models can buy assets without any haircut. Examples of this approach include He
and Pearson (1991b), He and Pag` es (1993), El-Karoui and Jeanblanc-Picqu´ e (1998),
and Detemple and Serrat (2003).
The third approach, and the focus of this paper, is essentially a combination of
the ﬁrst two. Investors face constraints on holdings of speciﬁc assets that depend
on their holdings of other assets. For example, investors can take out low-interest
collateralized loans, but markets limit such loans to a speciﬁc fraction of their long
position in another asset. Such an intermediate approach preserves the ﬂavor of the
ﬁrst approach — speciﬁc limits on individual assets — while adopting some of the
ﬂavor of the second, as investors can use long positions to at least partially oﬀset
short positions. Examples of this approach include Cuoco (1997), He and Pearson
(1991a,b), Cvitani´ c and Karatzas (1992), Vila and Zariphopolou (1997), Tepla (2000),
and Grossman and Vila (1992).
Some researchers have addressed the issue of collateralized borrowing explicitly.
Both Grossman and Vila (1992) and Vila and Zariphopoulou (1997) consider a bor-
rowing regime similar to ours in which investors can use some fraction of their stock
holdings as collateral for loans. But both models diverge from ours in that they
assume that investors receive no non-capital income, and in neither paper do the
4authors attempt to assess the quantitative importance of collateral restrictions.
A few papers [Cocco (2005), Yao and Zhang (2005)] consider models with risky
assets and housing, in which investors can use housing as collateral for loans. The
authors draw attention to the eﬀect of the housing investment on equity demand.
We address a completely diﬀerent question: the eﬀect on portfolio choice of using the
equity itself as collateral for loans.
We note several other papers in which researchers address the issue of collateralized
borrowing. Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002) allow investors to use up
to 98 percent of a investor’s equity holdings as collateral for low-interest loans in a
dynamic overlapping-generations model. They ﬁnd that such a borrowing opportunity
has little or no eﬀect on equilibrium asset prices. Finally, Fortune (2000, 2003)
discusses margin loans and other leverage methods. The reader should consult these
papers for a more detailed discussion of the issues addressed in Section 3.
2 The Model and Basic Intuition
We consider a partial-equilibrium model of investor consumption and portfolio choice.
Our model builds on the framework developed in Davis, Kubler, and Willen (2006).
As in that paper, we consider ﬁnitely lived investors who receive labor income, invest
in assets, and borrow.
Investors receive labor income from age 22 to age 65, retire and receive a constant
fraction of labor income in the last year of work, and die at age 80. We calculate
this fraction so that, on average, an investor receives a constant fraction of the last n
years of labor income. For details on this procedure, see Davis, Kubler, and Willen
(2006). Unlike that paper, we assume that labor income evolves non-stochastically.
It is possible to solve the model with stochastic labor income, but we opted against
doing so in order to focus attention on collateralized borrowing in what is already a
complicated model.
Investors can trade four ﬁnancial assets. They can buy equity (E) with stochastic
return ˜ RE, save (L) at a net risk-free rate RL, engage in uncollateralized borrowing
(U) at the rate RU ≥ RL, and engage in collateralized borrowing (S) at the rate RS,
where RL ≤ RS ≤ RU . We will often refer to the net returns on these assets, which

















+REEt−1 + RLLt−1 − RUUt−1 − RSSt−1.
We assume that the investor cannot die in debt, so UT = ST = 0.
Uncollateralized borrowing cannot exceed some fraction BL of current labor in-
come, although we sometimes set BL = ∞. Collateralized borrowing works as follows.
Let δ be the required down-payment on a dollar of equity. Let Et be equity holdings
and St be collateralized debt at time t. Then:
St ≤ (1 − δ)Et.
Using our notation, one could say that we permit no short sales of any assets. In
other words, one cannot borrow at RL or save at RU or RS. But if one views both
secured and unsecured borrowing as short positions in the riskless asset, then one
can view our portfolio restrictions as similar to those used by, for example, He and
Pearson (1991b), as discussed in the literature review.
An investor chooses a contingency plan for consumption, borrowing, and asset






subject to a sequence of budget constraints, where ca is consumption at age a, Et is the
expectations operator conditional on time-t information, 1/β is a time discount factor,
and U( ) is an isoelastic utility function. We solve numerically for the optimal solution
using a backward-induction algorithm, similar to that described in the appendix of
Davis, Kubler, and Willen (2006).
2.1 Basic Insights
We proceed in three steps. First, we provide a basic overview of the intuition for our
results. Second, we discuss them more formally in the context of a two-period model.
Third, we discuss how the simple mechanisms discussed interact in a dynamic context.
In Section 4, we measure the quantitative signiﬁcance of the eﬀects in realistically
parameterized examples.
6We characterize portfolio choice using a simple rule: If and only if the risk-adjusted
return on an asset exceeds (falls short of, equals) the rate at which one discounts risk-
less future consumption, should one add to (subtract from, not change) one’s position
in that asset. Before continuing, we need to explain how we calculate “risk-adjusted
return.” For each state of nature, we multiply the probability of the state by the
marginal utility of an investor’s consumption in that state and then renormalize to
create a new probability vector, the “risk-neutral” or “martingale” probabilities. The
risk-adjusted return is the expected return calculated using the risk-neutral proba-
bilities. To see how this works, suppose we have two states of nature both of which
occur with true probability 0.5, and an investor with high income in one state and
low income in the other. Since the marginal utility of consumption is higher in the
low-income state, we assign a risk-neutral probability of more than 0.5 to it, say
0.75 for the purpose of discussion, and, correspondingly, a probability of 0.25 to the
high-income state. Suppose that we have an asset which returns 100 percent in the
high-income state and zero percent in the low-income state. The true probabilities
yield an expected return of 50 percent for this asset, but the risk-neutral probabilities
generate a risk-adjusted return of only 25 percent, because we assign 75 percent of
the probability to the low-income state, in which the asset pays 0 percent. As we
show below, constraint means that risk neutral probabilities diﬀer across investors,
and, for a given investor, diﬀer across wealth levels. For a more complete discussion
of the topic, see He and Pearson (1991b).
It is easy to understand classical unconstrained portfolio theory using this rule: If
one can buy and sell unlimited quantities of all assets, then portfolio choice satisﬁes
optimality if and only if the risk-adjusted returns on all assets equal the individual
discount rate, and thus, each other. Otherwise, the rule says to buy more or less
of the asset, contradicting the optimality of the allocation. And, if one can trade
a riskless asset whose risk-adjusted return equals its observed return, then we know
that the risk-adjusted return of all assets must equal the return on that riskless asset,
and that return must equal the individual discount rate.
But borrowing and short-sales constraints, at ﬁrst blush, confound the rule. Sup-
pose, for example, that the risk-adjusted return on equity exceeds both the discount
rate and the return on the riskless bond. The simple rule from above says: Buy more!
But suppose one has already allocated all of one’s money to equity; what then? One
solution would be to short the riskless bond, but we have assumed that one cannot.
Another solution would be to take out an unsecured loan, but then one would be buy-
ing less of a bond, so one needs to be sure that the discount rate exceeds the return
on the bond, because, following our simple rule, one should buy less of an asset only
7if the risk-adjusted return falls short of the discount rate. What about secured debt?
We will show below that we can apply the basic rule from above to our problem by
making a few adjustments. First, we show that our adjustments for both risk and the
discount rate depend on how much ﬁnancial wealth a household has, conditional on a
given income process. Second, at an optimum, the risk-adjusted returns will typically
diﬀer across assets. Third, in measuring the risk-adjusted return on an asset, we will
need to take into account both the direct returns in the form of higher future income
and the indirect returns that arise from the eﬀect on limits of holding a particular
asset versus holding a diﬀerent asset: If we can use an asset as collateral for a loan,
then it yields a shadow beneﬁt of enabling low-cost credit.
To ﬁx our intuition we consider a two-period model. The Euler equation for
unsecured borrowing is:
u
′(c0) − RU E[u
′(˜ c1)] + λU − λBL = 0, (1)
where λU are λBL are Lagrange multipliers for the no-short-sales and borrowing con-
straints, respectively. For secured debt, we get:
u
′(c0) − RS E[u
′(˜ c1)] + λS − λSE = 0, (2)
where λS are λSE are Lagrange multipliers for the no-short-sales and collateral con-
straints, respectively. For the riskless asset, we get:
u
′(c0) − RL E[u
′(˜ c1)] − λL = 0, (3)
where λL is the Lagrange multiplier for the no-short-sales constraint. Finally, for
equity we get:
u
′(c0) − E[ ˜ REu
′(˜ c1)] − λE − (1 − δ)λSE = 0, (4)
where λE are λSE are Lagrange multipliers for the no-short-sales and collateral con-
straints, respectively. The usual complementary-slackness and non-negativity condi-
tions also apply.




≡ 1 + r T EQ[ ˜ Ri], (5)
where EQ is the expectation with respect to the martingale probabilities deﬁned by
the vector of investor marginal utilities. The quantity EQ[ ˜ Ri] is the formal deﬁnition of
“risk-adjusted return,” mentioned above. The direction of the inequality depends on
which constraints bind. If no constraints bind, then equation (5) holds with equality
and we get our standard consumption-based asset-pricing result. But constraints lead
8to inequality. Suppose the no-short-sales constraint holds on the riskless bond. Since
the expectations under the martingale probabilities and the true probabilities are the
same for a riskless asset, equation (3) implies that:
u′(c0)
E(u′(c1))
= 1 + r = EQ[RL] + λL > RL. (6)
Only one asset, or pair of assets, presents a problem: secured debt and equity. As
we mentioned before, equity provides extra beneﬁts in the form of relief from high
interest rates or limited debt. How do we integrate that with our pricing equation
(5)? If we assume that short-sales constraints on the two assets do not bind, then we
can substitute the collateral constraints from equations (2) and (4) to get:
u
′(c0) − E[((1/δ) ˜ RE − (1/δ − 1)RS)u
′(˜ c1)] = 0. (7)
Equation (7) implies that, in addition to the four assets under consideration, we can
add a ﬁfth, a portfolio of 1/δ dollars of equity ﬁnanced by 1/δ − 1 dollars of secured
debt. Note that this asset has a price of one dollar and has a convenient interpretation:
It is a fully leveraged stock portfolio or, as we will call it, the FLP.
We now consider a two-period-lived investor who receives 10 dollars in lifetime
income, discounted at the riskless rate rL, and two of those dollars this year. In
addition, we endow the investors with a certain amount of additional ﬁrst-period
wealth. The investor has a utility function, isoelastic across periods, with relative
risk aversion coeﬃcient of 3. We set rU = 10 percent, rL = 2 percent, E(˜ rE) = 8
percent, and rS = 5 percent. We limit unsecured borrowing to one year’s income and
require a 20 percent down-payment on any risky investment, implying that one can
use 80 percent of an asset as collateral for a loan.
Figure 1 shows portfolio choice in this example for diﬀerent levels of wealth. The
top half of the ﬁgure shows the discount rate and risk-adjusted returns for the diﬀerent
assets. The bottom half shows demand for diﬀerent types of assets. We call this
picture the “portfolio stairs” because of the shape of the path of the discount rate.
We ﬁrst consider investors with very little current wealth, to the left of wealth level A
on the x-axis. The individual discount rate is extremely high for low levels of wealth,
exceeding the return on all assets including the FLP (which yields 20 percent). Thus,
if we removed constraints, these investors would try to short everything, including
equity and even the FLP. To conﬁrm the theory, investors max out on unsecured
debt, the only asset they can actually short. As wealth increases, investors allocate it
entirely to current consumption, driving down the discount rate, so that the discount
rate line intersects the FLP return line at the point labelled A∗.
9To the immediate right of wealth level A, investors initiate purchases of the FLP.
Equation (7) holds, and the discount-rate line coincides with the risk-adjusted FLP
line. But now, as holdings of the risky asset increase, the implied martingale proba-
bilities change and the risk-adjusted return to equity and the FLP fall.
The discount rate reaches 10 percent at the point B∗. To the immediate right of
wealth level B, investors use additional wealth to pay oﬀ unsecured debt. In addition,
they invest a small portion of additional wealth in the fully leveraged portfolio. Since
no constraints are binding on either the FLP or unsecured debt, the discount rate
equals the return on the FLP and the return on unsecured debt.
Between wealth levels B and C on the x-axis, investors use most of their incre-
mental wealth to reduce unsecured debt and add a small amount to the FLP. At
wealth level C, all unsecured debt is paid oﬀ, and investors again start adding to
equity in earnest. Increased equity investment reduces the risk-adjusted return on
the FLP until the discount rate reaches 5 percent, the return on the secured debt.
Now, investors start to pay oﬀ the secured debt. At wealth level D, investors hold
three diﬀerent assets: secured debt, equity, and the FLP. To see why, note that any
partially leveraged portfolio equals a portfolio composed of equity and the fully lever-
aged portfolio. Thus, neither the short sale nor the collateral constraint binds any
longer.
At point E∗, the risk-adjusted return on the FLP falls below the discount rate,
and investors no longer engage in borrowing. To the right of wealth level E, investors
invest only in equity until both the risk-adjusted return on equity and the discount
rate reach the return on the riskless bond, just as in the standard model described at
the beginning of this section.
What do the portfolio stairs tell us? First, they show that in the presence of
margin requirements, suﬃciently low wealth always chokes oﬀ equity demand. If we
assume that the marginal utility of consumption blasts oﬀ to inﬁnity as consumption
approaches zero, some suﬃciently low level of wealth always yields a discount rate
that exceeds any given return on the fully leveraged portfolio.
Second, we learn that equity demand is not linear at all in wealth, nor does it
even vary smoothly with wealth. Equity demand is more sensitive to increases in
wealth at high and low levels of wealth than in between. At low levels of wealth,
the risk-adjusted returns to the fully leveraged portfolio make equity more attractive
than paying oﬀ debt. For moderate levels of wealth, the opposite is true. When the
unsecured debt is paid oﬀ, equity demand grows rapidly.
Third, they illustrate the value of the fully leveraged portfolio as a simple measure
of the importance of leverage. For low levels of wealth, the FLP oﬀers a summary
10statistic for the opportunity to invest in equity.
Fourth, a change in the borrowing interest rate aﬀects equity demand, even though
investors can buy equity without taking out an unsecured loan.
We draw the reader’s attention to three subtle issues in the model. First, what
happens in the extreme case where δ = 0? Equation (7) isn’t much use, but equations
(2) and (3) imply that:
EQ( ˜ RE) = RS (8)
at an optimum. Equation (8) is no diﬀerent from the corresponding equation in
a model with no constraints at all, at least for these two assets. Does that mean
that we can ignore the rest of the model? Not entirely. Purchases of unsecured
debt aﬀect future consumption and thus the martingale probabilities. Consider the
following simple example. Suppose the unsecured borrowing constraint binds and we
raise the interest rate by a tiny amount. Borrowing stays the same, but the level
of future consumption falls, which will generally skew the risk-neutral probabilities
toward the bad states, lowering the risk-adjusted return and reducing equity demand.
Alternatively, if we hold the interest rate ﬁxed and lower the borrowing limit, we raise
future consumption, which, following the same logic, should raise equity demand.
Second, unsecured borrowing aﬀects the welfare beneﬁts of investing in risky as-
sets. If an investor faces no margin requirements, he or she faces no limit on equity
purchases. But when the investor realizes the beneﬁts of the equity depends on
whether he or she can borrow. Buying lots of equity drives up consumption in period
1, but if, say, the investor faces a ﬁxed borrowing limit, then the beneﬁts accrue only
in the future, and with ﬁxed current consumption, generate diminishing marginal
returns.
Third, when we move to a multi-period model, the role of unsecured borrow-
ing expands. In the two-period model, unsecured borrowing facilitates consumption
smoothing and investment in the risky asset (or the FLP). But in a multi-period
model, unsecured borrowing at future dates allows a household to smooth adverse
asset-return outcomes in the future. In the context of our discussion above, such
smoothing moves the martingale probabilities closer to the true probabilities and
increases equity demand.
These last three points illustrate one of the key points of the paper: Even in the
presence of unlimited margin borrowing, unsecured credit availability still matters to
both the level and the welfare beneﬁts of equity ownership. We return to this point
when we consider the simulations.
112.2 Modeling borrowing constraints
In the literature review, we argued that a realistic treatment of borrowing in portfolio
choice models requires that we eschew asset-by-asset restrictions in favor of cross-
asset restrictions. In other words, we do not forbid borrowing altogether, but rather
require that borrowers combine their short positions in the riskless asset with long
positions in something else. But among the universe of cross-asset restrictions, we
chose a particular version and we now attempt to justify that choice. We believe
our approach represents the best combination of tractability and realism, but we
acknowledge its shortcomings. Our approach basically says that borrowers can use
some fraction of their long position in a risky asset to oﬀset a short position in the
riskless asset and get a lower interest rate. We ignore the possibility of shorting the
risky asset here for now.
One alternative to our approach is a “market wealth” constraint, using the ter-
minology of Luttmer (1996), which says that the value of a purchased portfolio must
exceed zero. A market wealth constraint is actually a special case of our setup in
which the fraction of long position usable as collateral is 100 percent and the inter-
est rate on secured borrowing equals the rate on riskless lending. The market wealth
constraint is unrealistically generous. Even hedge funds cannot get 0-percent haircuts
and our discussion in the next section demonstrates that the average investor cannot
get anything close to what hedge fund managers get.
Another alternative is a “solvency” constraint, again using Luttmer’s terminology,
which says that an investor cannot buy a portfolio that generates a negative payoﬀ
in any state of the world in the future. Lustig (2004) explicitly justiﬁes a solvency
constraint as emerging endogenously in a model in which investors can ﬁle for bank-
ruptcy and the lenders seize all their assets but impose no other punishments. And
such a constraint also emerges from Geanakoplos and Zame’s (2002) setup. Solvency
constraints seems somewhat more realistic than a market wealth constraint but they
often prove too restrictive. Essentially, they say that you cannot borrow more than
the worst possible outcome of an asset. As Merton (1975) points out, in a discrete time
model with lognormally distributed returns, the worst possible outcome is arbitrarily
small, and in such a model, a solvency constraint is equivalent to the restriction that
no one can borrow at all. Solvency constraints are also a special case of our model
if we set the collateral requirement equal to return of the asset in the worst possible
state and set the interest rate equal to the riskless rate.
To further complicate matters, both market wealth and solvency constraint ap-
proaches are unrealistically restrictive in that they forbid unsecured borrowing al-
together. As we show below, the ability to take out unsecured loans dramatically
12aﬀects the attractiveness of equity and of secured loans. To see how unsecured bor-
rowing aﬀects the situation, think of a margin loan. With a margin loan (described
in detail in Section 3.1), brokerages allow investors to borrow up to 50 percent of the
value of their stock holdings, but they retain the power to sell the stock in the event
that the net position falls below some prespeciﬁed amount. Since that prespeciﬁed
amount is always positive, we can view the restrictions on margin loans as solvency
constraints. However, if an investor can access unsecured credit, he or she can take
out an unsecured loan to keep the account above the prespeciﬁed level while violating
the solvency constraint.
3 Institutional Considerations
In this section, we look at ways investors can increase their leverage. We ﬁrst look at
margin loans, which explicitly allow investors to use equity as collateral for loans. We
then look at two alternative methods for achieving leverage, both of which implicitly
allow investors to borrow against equity holdings. The two alternatives are futures
and leveraged mutual funds. In the section, we seek both to give an overall idea of the
institutional barriers to collateralized borrowing and to generate parameters for our
simulations. Our discussion here parallels similar discussions in a good ﬁnance text-
book like Hull (2000), but our focus on the small investor diﬀerentiates our analysis,
as ﬁnance textbooks generally focus on investment opportunities for large, wealthy
investors.
All three investment programs discussed in this section allow investors to achieve
leverage by borrowing against equity holdings. But the terminology is sometimes
confusing or inconsistent. The leverage one can get on a margin loan is a function
of the margin requirement; the leverage one can get using futures is a function of
something called a “performance bond.” To allow for comparison of these methods,
we standardize our measurement of leverage, using an intuitive criterion: the “down
payment” required for a particular level of investment. That is, if the down payment
is 10 percent, then one needs $10,000 to make a $100,000 investment in equity. We
also measure the wedge between the interest rate on collateralized borrowing and the
rate of return on riskless bonds.
3.1 Margin Loans
The principle of a margin loan is quite simple. But how do they work in practice? In
Section 3.1.1, we discuss the basic principles and jargon of margin loans. In section
133.1.2, we discuss how the securities laws limit the availability of margin loans. Finally,
in section 3.1.3, we look at the availability of margin loans at several leading brokerage
houses.
3.1.1 How They Work
To explain how margin loans work, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne some terms. A margin loan
is a loan collateralized by holdings of equity. The value of the loan is called the debit
balance. Using the debit balance, we can deﬁne the margin percentage as follows:
Margin Percentage =
Value of securities - Debit balance
Value of securities
.
Brokerage ﬁrms typically specify two minimum margin percentages. The initial mar-
gin is the minimum margin percentage allowed when one borrows. Suppose (as is
generally the case in reality) that the initial margin is 50 percent. Then, an investor
who owns $100,000 in stock (say, 1000 shares at $100 each), can take out a $50,000
loan.
Value of Securities Debit Balance Margin Margin Percent
$100,000 $50,000 $50,000 50%
If the value of the stock increases, one can borrow more money. If the value of the
stock falls, however, the investor need not immediately sell stock nor pay back part of
the loan. The investor is now required only to keep the margin percentage above the
maintenance margin. Suppose the maintenance margin is 25 percent, and suppose
the share price falls to $66
2
3 a share.
Value of Securities Debit Balance Margin Margin Percent
$66,667 $50,000 $16,667 25%
Since the margin percentage is still at or above 25 percent, this investor need not do
anything. However, if the margin percentage falls further, the brokerage will make
a margin call, demanding that the investor raise the margin percentage above the
maintenance margin level. For example, if the share price falls to $50 a share, then
the margin percentage will be zero, and the investor must either reduce borrowing
(by putting up more cash) or sell stock.
Value of Securities Debit Balance Margin Margin Percent
$50,000 $50,000 $0 0%
143.1.2 Legal Issues
Before 1934, there were no statutory limits on margin credit. Brokerage ﬁrms argued
that margin loans were a way for investors with little wealth to share in the beneﬁts
of the stock market, and the exchanges made little eﬀort to limit margin borrowing.
In 1921-1922, the New York Stock Exchange did insist that investors maintain a
margin percentage of 10 percent, but it was not until the crash of 1929 that exchanges
tightened margin requirements in any meaningful way — raising the initial margin
requirement to 1/3 in that year.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was the ﬁrst legislative eﬀort to control
margin credit. The 1934 act gave the Federal Reserve authority over margin credit,
authorizing the Fed to set both initial and maintenance margin percentages, with the
proviso that initial margin percentages exceed 45 percent.
The Federal Reserve Board sets minimum margin requirements for broker-dealer
loans, using something called Regulation T. Until 1974, the Fed considered initial
margin percentages as an active component of monetary policy and changed them
fairly often. Table 1 shows that the Fed changed initial margin requirements on an
almost annual basis, with initial margin percentages reaching 100 percent in 1946 and
90 percent on two other occasions. Individual exchanges set maintenance margins,
subject to the approval of the SEC; typically, maintenance margins are set at 25
percent. However, as we show below, these minimums are rarely binding, as brokers
usually choose to set maintenance margins at a higher level.
Several other features of the regulation of margin borrowing are worth noting.
First, some types of securities are exempt from margin requirements: (1) Mortgages
backed by real property (Rule 3a12-5 of 1934 Act), so long as the credit is collater-
alized by the same property, there are regular mandatory payments on the principal
and interest on the credit, and the lender is not aﬃliated in any way with the issu-
ing broker-dealer; and (2) “direct participation program” securities (Rule 3a12-9 of
the 1934 Act), covering securities associated with venture capital or private equity.
Second, there are other limitations for speciﬁc assets. One can use a foreign asset
or an over-the-counter security as collateral only if the Fed has speciﬁcally approved
the asset in question for margin purposes. In addition, investors cannot use mutual
funds as collateral until they have held the fund for 30 days. Third, margin regu-
lations do not apply to accounts owned by U.S. investors who are located outside
the United States, and brokerage ﬁrms are apparently not shy about assisting their
high-net-worth customers in evading margin requirements through oﬀshore accounts.
Finally, investors cannot use as collateral for loans, investments in some tax-deferred
accounts like IRAs.
153.1.3 In Real Life
Table 2 summarizes access to margin loans at various brokerage houses. In principle,
most brokerages allow investors an initial margin percentage of 50 percent and a
maintenance margin of 35 percent, but almost all ﬁrms impose additional restrictions,
usually on stocks with low prices. For example, Vanguard does not allow any initial
margin borrowing on shares trading below ﬁve dollars. Firms that do not explicitly
limit margin borrowing for stocks with low prices do so implicitly in their maintenance
requirements. Fidelity requires that an investor maintain a margin of at least three
dollars per share or 100 percent if the share trades for less than three dollars.
Interest rates on margin loans vary considerably across ﬁrms. For small loans
(< $10,000), interest rates range from 7 percent at Brown and Company to 10.5 per-
cent at Charles Schwab. At the time the table was constructed, the return on short-
term Treasury notes was 3.71 percent, meaning that the spread on small-denomination
margin loans was between 300 and 650 basis points. Interest rates also vary dramat-
ically with the size of the loan. For example, at Fidelity, an investor who borrows
an amount less than $10,000 pays 9.825 percent; an investor who borrows more than
$500,000 pays only 4.75 percent. The rates charged by brokerages appear puzzlingly
high, given that the brokerage has legal custody of the collateral and the authority
to close out a position whenever the value of the collateral approaches the value of
the loan.
Brokerages also have minimum investment requirements just to open an account,
and these requirements may exceed the size of the loan. For example, Brown and
Company requires a minimum of $15,000 to open an account. Brown and Company
also requires that investors have a minimum net worth, exclusive of home equity, of
$50,000.
3.1.4 Leverage with Margin Loans
Overall, how much leverage do margin loans allow? The initial margin requirement
of 50 percent implies that investors can buy equity with a 50-percent down payment.
It is true that low-priced securities require higher down payments and that investors
cannot use margin loans as collateral for 30 days; however, our focus is on long-term
investors investing in well-diversiﬁed portfolios, so we can ignore these issues. There
appears to be enormous variation in the wedge between interest rates on collateralized
debt and rates on the riskless asset, both across ﬁrms and by the size of the loan.
But it seems that a small investor is unlikely to borrow with a wedge of less than 3
percent.
163.2 Futures
In theory, futures allow investors to get unlimited leverage. In practice, however, the
ability to get leverage using futures is limited. In this section, we ﬁrst discuss how
futures work in theory and in practice. We then discuss how the practical limitations
aﬀect small investors.
3.2.1 How Futures Work
A future is a commitment by an investor to buy or sell an asset at a given time at
an agreed price. We consider an “e-Mini S&P contract.”2 On December 12, 2002,
by buying an e-Mini S&P, an investor agrees to buy 50 times the S&P 500 index for
$48,050 at the end of March 2003; another investor agrees to sell 50 times the S&P 500
for $48,050 at the end of March 2003.3 No money changes hands, so in theory, both the
buying and selling investors have $48,050 worth of exposure to equity markets without
any investment at all. In practice, however, brokerages and exchanges demand money
to make sure that investors never (or hardly ever) have trouble fulﬁlling their promises,
requiring an investor to post a “performance bond” with the exchange and insisting
on daily settlement. We discuss each of these mechanisms in turn.
What is a performance bond? When an investor either buys or sells a futures
contract, he or she is required to post a bond with the exchange. The amount of
money is ﬁxed by the exchange (although some brokers require higher amounts).
The size of the performance bond generally varies with the size and volatility of the
contract, but it is not a ﬁxed fraction. The CME Rulebook states:4 “Performance
bond requirements will be as determined by Exchange staﬀ from time to time.” The
size of the performance bond is not ﬁxed over time either. Again from the CME
Rulebook:
In the event market conditions and price ﬂuctuations at any time shall
cause the President to conclude that additional performance bonds are
required to maintain an orderly market or to preserve ﬁscal integrity, the
President may call for additional performance bonds to be deposited with
2An “e-Mini S&P” contract is a product available at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)
that enables an investor to purchase small denomination contracts on the S&P 500 Index.
3For expositional simplicity, we fudge the distinction between futures and forwards. What we
describe is actually a forward contract. In fact, a buyer of a futures contract agrees to pay the value
of the futures contract on the next trading day, unless the next trading day is the expiration day of
the contract, in which case he actually purchases the index.
4The CME (originally the Chicago Mercantile Exchange) is the largest futures exchange in the
world.
17the Clearing House during the next banking hour after demand therefor,
or at such times as may be speciﬁed. Such additional performance bonds
may be called from the longs or the shorts or from both.
For example, on December 12, 2002, the CME performance bond requirement for a
March 2003 e-Mini S&P 500 contract was $3563, or 7.9 percent of the contract value.
Lind-Waldock, a large futures broker, actually demanded more: $3,938, or 8.2 percent
of the contract value.
What does daily settlement mean? At the end of each trading day, an investor
is required, essentially, to settle his transaction as if the contract ended on that day.
Consider the e-Mini discussed above. Suppose our investor agreed on December 12,
2002, to sell 50 times the S&P 500 in March 2003 for $45,050. What happens on the
following day? On December 13, 2002, the new, agreed-upon price for March 2003
was $44,325. To settle this contract, our investor has to pay $725, and that amount
is deducted from the performance bond.
Settlement raises another question: Now that the exchange has deducted $725
from the performance bond, isn’t the bond insuﬃcient? Not necessarily. As with
margin loans, there is an initial performance bond amount and a maintenance perfor-
mance bond amount. In this case, the CME maintenance performance bond’s value
is $2850 (Lind-Waldock required $3,150). If we deduct the $725 loss from the orig-
inal $3563 performance bond, we see that the performance bond’s value now equals
$2,838, and the investor needs to post $12 to maintain the contract.









12/12/02 (Thurs.) 901 $45050 3563 3563
12/13/02 (Fri.) 886.50 $44325 2850 2838
3.2.2 Practical Issues for Small Investors
According to the above discussion, futures may not allow unlimited leverage, but they
allow investors to invest in equity with a down payment of around 8 percent. We now
argue that 8 percent may still be an underestimate of the down payment. We focus
on two aspects of the futures market that inhibit small investors from realizing the
full leverage implicit in futures contracts. We note that, in principle, one can avoid
these frictions by pooling one’s money with that of other investors, but we direct the
reader to the next section where we discuss existing eﬀorts to do so.
18First, futures contracts are lumpy. An investor who wants $71,250 worth of expo-
sure to the S&P 500 cannot buy 1.5816 contracts. He or she must buy either one or
two contracts.
Second and more signiﬁcantly, a long-term investor cannot simply buy a futures
contract and hold it. First, as we saw above, one day after going into the futures
market, our investor received a margin call. Our investor can do one of several things.
First, he or she can put up more money, either by borrowing or by setting aside
money before entering into the contract to ensure that most margin calls can be met.
However, both of these strategies reduce the eﬀective level of leverage for the investor:
the former by raising the interest rate on borrowing, and the latter by increasing the
up-front money required for the investment. Second, he or she can simply decide that
if there ever were a margin call, he or she would close the position. However, on most
sample paths, the return on the asset would then simply reﬂect the maintenance level
of the performance bond. Finally, an investor can reduce exposure when the market
goes down and increase exposure when the market goes up. In our example, the
value of the performance bond on December 13, 2002, equalled $2838. This is not
enough for one e-Mini but it is enough for 99.58 percent of one. Unfortunately, as we
pointed out above, one can buy only integer values of the contracts. In addition, even
if one’s investments were large enough to avoid the integer problem, such a strategy
would involve almost daily buying and selling of contracts and would therefore incur
signiﬁcant transactions costs.
3.2.3 Leverage with Futures
Overall, how much leverage do futures allow? Table 3 shows some institutional fea-
tures of futures trading at several brokerages. We show above that one can buy equity
with an 8-percent down payment using futures. We view this as a lower bound, how-
ever. Absence of arbitrage ensures that the eﬀective borrowing rate implicit in futures
contracts equals the riskless rate. Thus, there is no wedge.
3.3 Mutual Funds
Mutual fund companies oﬀer funds that explicitly aim to leverage broad equity port-
folios. Thus, they oﬀer a particularly easy way for investors to get leverage, and, since
these funds use options and futures to get leverage, they provide us with a window
into the costs and opportunities for leverage provided by options and futures.
Two ﬁrms oﬀer mutual funds that leverage the S&P 500 Index: Rydex and Pro-
19Funds.5 Table 4 summarizes information and recent results for these funds. Rydex
describes the objectives of its Titan 500 fund as follows:
Rydex Titan 500 Fund seeks investment results that correlate to the per-
formance of the S&P 500 Index. The fund primarily invests in leveraged
instruments, such as futures contracts and options on securities, futures
contracts, and stock indices. Futures and options contracts enable the
fund to pursue its objective without investing directly in the securities
included in the S&P 500. The fund may also purchase equity securities,
engage in equity index swaps, and enter into repurchase agreements. The
Fund’s advisor will attempt to consistently apply leverage to increase the
fund’s exposure to 200 percent of the S&P 500 Index. This fund is non-
diversiﬁed.
The objectives of the ProFunds UltraBull fund are similar. These ﬁrms also oﬀer
leveraged positions on other indices like NASDAQ and even oﬀer “bear” funds that
aim to return -100 percent of the return on a particular index.
Expense ratios and realized returns on these funds suggest that leverage using
futures and options is quite costly. The expense ratios on these funds range from 144
to 245 basis points. For comparison, note that the expense ratio on the Vanguard
Index 500, which provides no leverage, is about an order of magnitude smaller.
The realized returns oﬀer even less cause for optimism. Over the year to November
2005, the ProFunds UltraBull Fund earned 10.95 percent, scarcely more than two
percentage points above the Vanguard Index 500 Fund. The record over three years
yields a larger excess return for the leveraged funds, but the 5-year returns do not
appear to be consistent with the stated goals of the fund.
What can we learn about using futures and options from these mutual funds?
First, sophisticated fund managers seem unable to provide eﬃcient vehicles for in-
vestors to double their exposure to equity. Second, since ﬁrms oﬀer a maximum
potential leverage of doubling an investment, it seem reasonable to conclude that
achieving greater leverage using options is diﬃcult. Obviously, demand factors play
a role as well, but if mutual fund ﬁrms could oﬀer very high leverage at reasonable
prices, one might think they would.
3.3.1 Leverage with Mutual Funds
Overall, how much leverage do mutual funds allow? These funds promise to allow a
50-percent down payment for equity risk. The expense ratios suggest that the eﬀective
5A third, Potomac, appears to have dropped out of the market.
20wedge between the riskless rate and the cost of borrowing is on the order of 150 basis
points or more.
4 Simulations
In this section, we consider a dynamic model of life-cycle portfolio choice in which we
allow investors to use equity as collateral for collateralized loans. We have two main
ﬁndings. First, investors who forgo the realistic leverage opportunities documented
above pay a miniscule price — a fraction of a percent of certain-equivalent lifetime
consumption. Second, eliminating all restrictions on collateralized debt would allow
investors to increase certain-equivalent consumption much more, but the gains depend
on how hard it is for investors to take out uncollateralized loans and how bad the
worst possible outcome is for stocks.
4.1 Parameters
Table 5 shows the basic parameters we use for our simulations. We draw the reader’s
attention to ﬁve aspects of our parameterization.
First, our treatment of collateralized borrowing follows the analysis in Section 2.
Our baseline speciﬁcation allows investors to buy a dollar of equity by putting up only
a twenty-ﬁve-cent down payment; that is, it allows four-to-one leverage. According
to our analysis, such a level of leverage is not diﬃcult to achieve — for example, an
investor could buy a share of the Rydex Titan 500 Fund, which theoretically oﬀers
a 50-percent down payment, and then take out a margin loan, which means that
the down payment would amount to 25 percent altogether. We assume that the
collateralized borrowing rate is two-hundred basis points above the lending rate in
our baseline case.
Second, we discretize the equity-return process, using the procedure of Tauchen
and Hussey (1991). The procedure generates a ﬁnite space of return realizations, all
of which exceed zero. The level of the minimum return realization aﬀects the use of
collateralized borrowing signiﬁcantly. See Section 4.2 for a discussion.
Third, we assume that the baseline expected return on equity is 6 percent and that
the standard deviation of return on equity is 15 percent. Our expected return is at
the low end of estimates in the literature, but we show that our results are generally
robust to higher expected returns.
Fourth, we use estimates from Davis, Kubler, and Willen (2006) to choose the
borrowing rate for uncollateralized debt. We use their baseline speciﬁcation of an
218-percent borrowing rate, implying a 6-percentage-point wedge between borrowing
rates and lending rates.
Finally, we use estimates of the life-cycle proﬁle of income from Gourinchas and
Parker (2002) as adjusted by Davis, Kubler, and Willen (2006). Figure 2 shows the
labor income proﬁle of our baseline household.
4.2 Portfolio Choice
Our simulations yield several results on the quantitative importance of collateralized
borrowing in life-cycle models of portfolio choice.
First, margin requirements must be relatively low and the secured borrowing rate
must be low to signiﬁcantly aﬀect equity demand. The top panel of Figure 3 shows
that if the down payment requirement exceeds 50 percent, equity demand hardly
increases in response to a lower secured borrowing rate. With a secured borrowing
rate of 4 percent, a minimum down payment of 1/3 fails to yield an appreciable
increase in equity holding. Looking at the ﬁgure, one clearly sees a kink, and that
kink corresponds to the point at which the return on the fully leveraged portfolio
exceeds the unsecured borrowing rate. Below the kink, investors will pay oﬀ debt
before they start investing in equity; above the kink, they start investing in equity
while still holding unsecured debt, implying that the threshold level of wealth required
for stock ownership goes up as we relax collateral requirements. The lower panel of
Figure 3 conﬁrms this, showing that younger investors with less wealth own much
less equity, and with tighter collateral requirements, than older investors.
Second, the unsecured borrowing rate matters a lot. The top panel of Figure 4
shows equity demand for an investor who faces no margin requirements and can take
secured loans at the riskless rate. In other words, margin borrowing is as generous as
can be. Raising the unsecured borrowing rate dramatically aﬀects demand for equity
anyway, with a rise in rates from 2 percent to 8 percent cutting demand by almost
half. Consumption smoothing drives these results. As we discussed in Section 2,
unsecured borrowing aﬀects the sensitivity of consumption to asset-return outcomes
and thus the risk-neutral probabilities.
Third, bad states matter a lot. To see why, consider a model with no unsecured
borrowing. In this case, the largest possible loss an investor can withstand in the next
period equals his income. Working backwards, the investor cannot buy a portfolio that
involves, in the worst possible state, losses that exceed his or her income. For example,
suppose that an investor has income of $20,000 next year and suppose the worst
possible stock outcome is -50 percent. Even if the secured interest rate equals zero
and there are no margin requirements, the investor cannot purchase more than $40,000
22worth of stock. The eﬀects are pronounced, even in less extreme circumstances. The
lower panel of Figure 4 shows that a worst state of 60-percent loss yields equity
demand more than a third lower than a worst possible state of 12 percent.
4.3 Consumption and Welfare
We now explore how the collateralized borrowing regime aﬀects lifetime certain-
equivalent consumption. We see two motivations for this exercise. First, we can
calculate the value to investors of the right to use equity as collateral for loans. Since
we observe very few investors actually using existing collateral facilities, we can get
some understanding of how much utility they lose, if any. Second, some of the limits
on collateral are statutory. By exploring utility gains from more liberal collateral
regimes, we can measure the welfare loss of existing restrictions.
We measure the welfare gains with respect to two benchmarks. At one end, we
have a model with no collateralized debt. We allow investors to take out uncollat-
eralized loans at 8-percent interest but restrict the value of these loans to one year’s
income. At the other end, we have the Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) model
in which investors can borrow unlimited amounts at the riskless lending rate. In
our example, with a 4-percent equity premium, the top panel of Figure 5 shows that
going from our no-margin benchmark to the Merton-Samuelson model leads to an
increase in certain-equivalent consumption of more than 50 percent. The question
in this section concerns how much of that utility gain we can get by allowing col-
lateralized borrowing. In other words, can collateralized borrowing substitute for
uncollateralized borrowing?
The answer, in short, is no. If we assume a down payment requirement of 50 per-
cent, we see that, even with a collateralized borrowing rate of 2 percent, the increase
in utility is approximately 1 percent. If we eliminate the down payment requirement
altogether, we still get a welfare increase of only about 7 percent. That represents
a substantial increase in utility, but it is still nearly an order of magnitude smaller
than the increase yielded by unlimited uncollateralized borrowing at the riskless rate.
Even if we eliminate the limit on unsecured borrowing (that is, if we allow unlimited
collateralized debt at 2 percent and unlimited uncollateralized debt at 10 percent ),
the increase in certain-equivalent consumption is still only a quarter as large as it
would be if we could go to the full Merton-Samuelson setup. The lower panel of Fig-
ure 5 shows that the basic ﬁndings are robust to a higher equity return and a lower
borrowing rate. With an expected return on equity of 8 percent and a borrowing
rate of 8 percent, the gain from eliminating all borrowing restrictions is 120 percent
of lifetime certain-equivalent consumption. But the gains in collateralized borrowing
23regimes are generally a small fraction of the gains in the Merton-Samuelson scenario.
That the gains from reducing restrictions on collateralized borrowing should be so
much smaller than the gains from eliminating restrictions on uncollateralized borrow-
ing is somewhat surprising. The top left panel of Figure 6 shows the demand for equity
over the life cycle under various diﬀerent regimes. Compare the Merton-Samuelson
investor with the investor who can engage in unlimited collateralized borrowing but
faces limited uncollateralized borrowing (BL = 1). The gap in equity demand is ini-
tially quite large, but by retirement, the Merton-Samuelson investor’s equity demand
is less than double that of the borrowing-constrained investor, and in retirement the
gap vanishes. Yet the gain to the Merton-Samuelson investor is about 10 times as
large as the gain to the borrowing-constrained investor. Why?
First, the increase in consumption for the Merton-Samuelson investor is much
higher, especially early in the life cycle. In fact, initially allowing unlimited margin
borrowing for an investor with BL = 1 leads to a negligible increase in consump-
tion. The intuition is simple. By leveraging up in equity, investors raise their future
expected resources. But that increases current consumption only if investors can bor-
row against these resources easily. If investors can borrow only an amount equal to
income, then consumption initially increases hardly at all. If investors can borrow an
unlimited amount at 10 percent, consumption goes up somewhat more — by around
$3,000 initially. And if investors can borrow an unlimited amount at 2 percent, then
initial consumption balloons by $25,000.
The overall lifetime proﬁle of certain-equivalent consumption is quite diﬀerent from
the proﬁle of consumption. The Merton-Samuelson investor enjoys a much higher level
of consumption initially, compared with the borrowing-constrained investor. However,
since the Merton-Samuelson investor has much higher exposure to equity, his or her
unconditional standard deviation of consumption is much higher, and thus certain-
equivalent consumption grows much more slowly. By about age 50, certain-equivalent
consumption is actually higher for the borrowing-constrained investor with access to
collateralized borrowing.
5 Empirical Analysis
We now explore whether investors actually use the mechanism described in the previ-
ous section to generate leverage. We approach the data from three diﬀerent directions.
First, we look at investor-level data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
Second, we look at margin-loan-use data, both in the aggregate and at the level of
individual brokerages. Finally, we look at investor use of leveraged mutual funds. All
24three methods yield one conclusion: Investors do not make much use of the methods
described above to obtain leverage. Is this consistent with the theory? In Section
4.2, we showed that most investors would take out collateralized loans, even with
realistically ungenerous collateralized borrowing opportunities. However, in Section
4.3, we showed that the loans increased utility by a miniscule amount. So we view
the results below as evidence consistent with the model.
5.1 Household Data
The SCF asks households about both margin loans and futures.
On margin loans, the 1998 SCF asked two questions:
1. Do you (or anyone in your family living here) currently have any margin loans
at a stock brokerage?
2. Altogether, what is the current balance on these margin loans?
Table 6 shows some information from the SCF, adjusted for oversampling of high-
net-worth households using the weights provided by the SCF. What do the SCF data
tell us? First, they show that fewer than one percent of households have positive
margin loan balances. Since one needs to own stock to get a margin loan, we also
look at stockowners: 3.7 percent of stockowners have margin loans, four times as
many as the population as a whole. Second, margin-loan holdings are higher for
more-highly educated households, even when we condition on stock-owning. Third,
margin borrowers account for a somewhat disproportionate share of ﬁnancial wealth.
Column 3 shows the percentage of total stock holdings in the SCF accounted for by
margin borrowers. Finally, total margin borrowing is extremely small. The average
margin borrowing for households with non-zero margin loans is only $844.
On futures, the SCF asks households whether they have “futures contracts [or]
stock options” and, if so, the size of the balance of their accounts. Obviously, this
question confounds eﬀorts to separate futures from options, and, worse yet, the “fu-
tures/options” questions are jointly coded with “Oil/gas/mineral leases or invest-
ments.” We know only whether an investor has any combination of futures or options
or mineral leases. Thus, the SCF can provide us with only an upper bound, but it
is an upper bound that appears to be very low. About half of one percent of house-
holds reported any of the above investments. Again, more-highly educated people are
more likely to have them. Although one can own futures and options (and mineral
leases) without owning stock, it is informative to look at households that own stock.
Households that own stock are three times as likely to own a combination of futures,
25options, and mineral leases as households that do not own stock, implying an upper
bound on futures ownership of less than 2 percent of stock-owning households.
Margin-loan data from brokerages reveal information consistent with the low lev-
els of margin-loan balances in the SCF. Figure 7 shows debit balances in margin
accounts at New York Stock Exchange member ﬁrms as a percentage of total market
capitalization from 1992 to 2002. The ﬁgure shows that margin-loan balances have
ﬂuctuated considerably over the last 10 years, notably spiking as part of the internet
stock boom at the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000. However, the overall lev-
els of margin debt, even at the peak, were quite low, never exceeding 2.5 percent of
total market capitalization and rarely exceeding 2.0 percent. Firm-level information
on margin accounts paints a more diﬀuse picture. Table 7 shows margin debt as a
percentage of customer assets at eight brokerage houses. Levels of margin debt vary,
with Merrill Lynch customers borrowing only 1.3 percent of their assets and E*Trade
customers borrowing almost 10 percent of their assets. These diﬀerences at least
partly reﬂect the fact that Merrill has more retirement accounts, on which customers
cannot take margin loans. However, the ﬁrms with high margin-debt levels are those
typically associated with day-trading of internet stocks. In that sense, this table pro-
vides some indirect evidence that households that do use margin loans generally do
so for speculative rather than life-cycle reasons.
Finally, we return to the leveraged mutual funds. The right-hand column of Table
4 shows that investment in the leveraged mutual funds discussed in Section 3.3 is
small. The most successful fund, the Rydex Titan 500 Index, had $54.6 million under
management on June 30, 2005, or less than one-tenth of one percent of the assets
under management in the unleveraged Vanguard Index 500 Fund.
6 The Participation Puzzle Revisited
We now return to an issue posed in the introduction. Does realistic treatment of
collateralized debt weaken the argument that borrowing limits are an explanation
of why so many investors hold little or no equity? More precisely, researchers have
shown that borrowing limits of one kind or another dramatically reduce the gains to
holding equity, and, in combination with reasonable transactions costs, can eliminate
these gains altogether. But critics contend that such models ignore the distinction
between secured and unsecured debt and that the conclusions rest on an unrealistic
treatment of the former.
Before continuing, let us brieﬂy recap the participation puzzle — the fact that
more people do not hold equity in spite of the historically high returns it has oﬀered
26— and explain why borrowing limits can potentially resolve it. Table 8 (in the ﬁrst
two rows of the ﬁrst column) shows that, in a reasonably parameterized life-cycle
model with unlimited borrowing and lending at the riskless rate, equity investment
raises certain-equivalent consumption by 25 percent. We refer to this model as the
“standard” model, which most ﬁnance students, even at the graduate level, study in
some version. No reasonable transaction or information costs can possibly oﬀset the
gains to equity trade in the standard model, and so the low incidence of participation
shown in the data indeed presents a puzzle. What if we limit borrowing? Table 8
shows that if we modify the standard model by raising the borrowing rate to 10 percent
(in the ﬁrst two rows of the second column), the welfare gain to equity holding shrinks
to about 0.5 percent of lifetime consumption. Why do the gains fall so much? In the
former case, the expected return on equity exceeds the cost of borrowing, allowing
even investors with no liquid wealth to invest proﬁtably in equity. But when the
borrowing interest rate exceeds the expected return on equity, no one ever borrows to
buy equity, and only investors with liquid wealth reap the gains of equity ownership.
For a signiﬁcant portion of the life cycle, most investors have little liquid wealth
and, consequently, little to gain from holding equity. Gomes and Michaelides (2005)
exploit this ﬁnding by adding a participation cost to the model. Since the gains to
equity holding are small, a similarly small participation cost wipes out the beneﬁts
of equity holding and leads to non-participation. Hence, the participation puzzle is
solved! Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) performs a conceptually similar calculation, but she
works from the data and calculates the welfare beneﬁt to SCF households of moving
from their current allocation to an optimal allocation. But she implicitly rules out
collateralized borrowing by assuming that stock holdings cannot exceed liquid wealth.
Critics of the borrowing-constraints solution to the participation puzzle argue
several things. First, they argue that collateralized borrowing opportunities do exist,
so that even if we limit unsecured borrowing, investors can still get high leverage.
As we show above, the average investor has limited opportunities for collateralized
borrowing. Furthermore, the gains to such opportunities fall far short of the gains to
unlimited borrowing and lending.
We do not view our results as resolving the participation puzzle, but rather as
reducing its magnitude. According to Table 8, with plausible parameters of margin
of 25 percent and a secured borrowing rate of 3 percent, a household that holds no
equity gives up 1.8 percent of lifetime consumption relative to a household that avails
itself of both equity and collateralized borrowing against that equity. 1.8 percent of
lifetime consumption remains a rather large sum; Few people would walk away from
that. But we think the correct way to view the 1.8 percent is in comparison with
27the 25 percent oﬀered by unlimited borrowing and lending. Realistic treatment of
borrowing reduces the participation puzzle by an order of magnitude.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we examined the eﬀects of collateralized borrowing in a realistically
parameterized life-cycle portfolio choice problem. As we discussed, previous applied
research generally assumed either unlimited collateralized or uncollateralized borrow-
ing, or none at all. Our general conclusion is that models with collateralized bor-
rowing are closer to models with no borrowing at all than to models with unlimited
uncollateralized borrowing.
We see two natural directions for future research in this area. First, assets diﬀer
enormously in their potential to be used as collateral. One can use at least 90 percent
of the value of real estate as collateral for loans. Thus, the fully leveraged return
on such assets could potentially exceed the return on the fully leveraged portfolio
of equity, possibly explaining why some investors invest in real estate when equity
appears to oﬀer a higher return. Second, if we really want to address the participation
puzzle, we need to extend our model. In Section 2, we showed that an asset usable as
collateral has a shadow return because it relaxes a constraint. The transactions value
of bonds could generate a similar shadow return for bonds, and this could explain why
households hold bonds when the apparent risk-adjusted return on stocks is higher.
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33Table 2: Access to margin loans at various brokerages. Some interest rates for comparison, as of 11/18/2005 – Call Money (Broker Call Rate): 5.75;



















50% of net amount (below $5
per share requires 100%
payment)
Greater of 35% of market
value or $3 per share
<20,000 1.25
7.50
20,000 – 49,999.99 0.75




50% of purchase price
Greater of 35% of purchase
price, $3 per share or 100% of
purchase price if price less




10,000 – 24,999.99 1.50
25,000 – 49,999.99 1.00
50,000 – 99,999.99 0.50




50% of purchase cost. $5,000
in cash or marginable
securities minimum.
Marginable securities include
most exchange traded stocks
and Nasdaq-listed securities
above $5 per share
30% of total account value
unless volatile or low-priced
security, where it will be
higher (up to 100%)
<10,000 3.00
7.50
10,000 – 24,999 2.00
25,000 – 49,999 1.50
50,000 – 99,999 0.50
100,000 – 249,999 0.375
250,000 – 999,999 0.25








50% of purchase cost (below
$5 per share requires 100%
payment)
30% for stocks priced >$5
100% for price = $5 or less
<10,000 2.75
5.625
10,000 – 24,999 2.50
25,000 – 49,999 1.875
50,000 – 74,999 1.375




50% of marginable stock,
which generally includes those
equity securities registered on
a national securities exchange
or Nasdaq





25,000 – 49,999 3.125
50,000 – 74,999 2.75
75,000 – 99,999 2.125
100,000 – 249,999 1.125
250,000 – 499,999 0.75
500,000 – 999,999 0.375
1,000,000 – 4,999,999 0.00
5,000,000 – 9,999,999 -0.375
10,000,000+ -0.750



















50% of net amount for listed
or Fed-approved OTC equity.
100% of net amount for other
equity and all warrants.
Additionally, they maintain a
list of non marginable
securities
Greater of 30% of market
value or $3.00 per share for
listed or Fed-approved OTC
equity. 100% of market value
for other equity and warrants
<25,000 1.50
7.50
25,000 – 49,999 1.00
50,000 – 99,999 0.50
100,000 – 249,999 0.25
250,000 – 999,999 0.00
1,000,000+ -0.50
Ameritrade
50% of purchase cost for
eligible securities
25% of market value of




25,000 – 49,999 0.75
50,000 – 99,999 -0.25
100,000 – 249,999 -0.50





50% initial requirement for
listed and approved Nasdaq
stock above $4.00 per share.
100% for stocks at $4.00 per
share or below
30% for listed and approved
Nasdaq stock above $5.00 per
share. 50% for stock valued at
$4.01 to $5.00 per share.




25,000 – 49,999 0.75
50,000 – 99,999 0.25
100,000 – 249,999 0.00
250,000 – 999,999 -0.50
1,000,000+ -1.25
Source: All information was obtained on the public web-sites of each respective ﬁnancial ﬁrm.
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5Table 3: Institutional features of the futures market.







of $2,000. No account size
maintenance requirement
Oﬀers exchange minimum margins for
overnight positions. Day trade
margins generally of overnight margin
requirement
$3.50 per side (E-Mini contracts). $7.00 per side
(accounts opened with $5,000 or more but no
maintenance requirement). $14.50 per side (accounts
opened with $2,000 to $5,000)
Examples:
E-Mini S&P 500 (contract
value = $56,800)
$3,563, $2,850 maintenance








Range from 2% to 15% of value of
contract with majority around 5%
$2.50 to $17.50 per side. $3 round turn (buy and sell a
contract in any order) rebate for online trading
Examples:
E-Mini S&P 500 (contract
value = $56,800)
$3,938, $3,150 maintenance







Oﬀers exchange minimum margin
requirements (subject to change
without notice). Normally around 5%.
One-on-One (access to own team of brokers/traders) - $15
to $21.50 per side. Discount - $2 to $15 per side. Rate
dependent on style of trading, number of contracts






Full sevice (broker assisted) -
no account minimum.
Online and discount - $3,000
account minimum
(speculative), $1,000 (hedge)
Oﬀers exchange minimum margin
requirements
Full service - $17.50 to $29.90 per side. Online - $6 to






Oﬀers exchange minimum margin
requirements. Normally around 5% to
10%
1-80 contracts/mth - $11 per side per contract. 81-200 -
$9 (E-mini market orders), $10 (other market orders), $11
(limit, stop, others). 201-300 - $8.50 (E-mini market
orders), $9.50 (other market orders), $10.50 (limit, stop,
others). Over 300 - $8 (E-mini market orders), $9 (other
market orders), $10 (limit, stop, others)
Examples:
E-Mini S&P 500 (contract
value = $56,800)
$3,562, $2,850 maintenance




6Table 4: Mutual funds that leverage the S&P 500. Vanguard Index 500 included for comparision. Data as of 6/30/05.
Fund name Leverage Expense 1-yr 3-yr 5-yr Assets
in % ratio in % return return return
S&P 500 Index - - 8.72 12.85 -1.74
Vanguard Index 500 100 0.18 8.60 12.70 -1.85 70.89 B
ProFunds UltraBull 200 1.44 10.95 19.92 -11.70 129.75 M
Rydex Titan 500 200 2.45 10.53 18.66 - 54.63 M
Source: http://ﬁnance.yahoo.com
3
7Table 5: Parameter values.
Parameter Baseline Alternative values
RRA 3 2
Discount factor 0.95
Age of labor force entry 21
Age of retirement 65
Age of death 80
rU 8% 2%, 5%, 8%, 20%, 99%
B 1 0.5, 2, unlimited
rS 4% 2%, 3%, 5%
M 25% 2%,7% 50%, 100%
rL 2%
rE 6% 8%
std ˜ r 15%
std˜ ǫ 0% 15%
std ˜ η 0% 12%
Table 6: Who has margin loans? 1998 SCF. Percentages calculated using SCF weights.




















All 0.8 3.7 6.1 844 0.5 1.5 2.5
College degree 1.6 5.5 6.0 1159 1.3 3.5 4.8
Grad. degree 3.1 6.0 8.7 3298 1.2 2.1 2.7
Age 20-40 0.6 4.2 3.9 82 0.5 1.0 1.2
Age 40-60 1.2 4.0 6.6 905 0.4 1.8 2.8
Age 60-80 0.7 3.1 6.8 2042 0.8 1.9 2.6
Source: 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances
38Table 7: Margin debt at diﬀerent ﬁrms, 1999.
Entity Margin debt as % of customer assets
Merrill Lynch 1.3%







Source: New York Stock Exchange.
39Table 8: Certain-equivalent consumption for various asset choice menus. rU is the unsecured bor-
rowing rate, and rS is the secured borrowing rate. Margin is the “down payment” on an investment;
that is, if the margin is 25 percent, you can use only 75 percent of the investment as collateral. For
the rU = 10% case, we assume that total unsecured borrowing cannot exceed annual labor income.
All simulations follow baseline assumption in the paper. Expected return on equity is 6%, relative
risk aversion is 3, subjective discount factor is 0.97. Note that rU = 2% renders secured credit
redundant, hence the “–”s in the relevant locations in the table. Values are CE consumption in
$1000s. Percentages (in parentheses) represent increases from the base case of the ﬁrst row.
rU = 2% rU = 10%
First, assume no secured debt
(1) No equity 28.1 24.8



































40Figure 1: The portfolio stairs. See Section 2 for an explanation. Note that the FLP line and the discount rate line coincide between wealth levels A
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42Figure 3: How does collateralized borrowing aﬀect lifetime demand for equity? Top panel shows
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44Figure 5: How much does collateralized borrowing raise lifetime certain equivalent consumption?
տ No margin loans
↓ BL = 1,δ = 50%
BL = ∞,δ = 0% →
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6Figure 7: Debit balances at NYSE ﬁrms. Figure shows margin debt as a percentage of total market
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